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This paper aims to promote a greater understanding of how the ‘black box’ of implementation in a 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme interacts with the quality of implementation. The ‘black 
box’ of implementation refers here to programme and external  factors that could impact the 
outcome of the programme such as: the capacity of municipalities; the supply of services; the 
integration of services; geography; political motivations; levels of poverty; and urban versus rural 
context. By taking data from federal Brazilian datasets related to these factors and administrative 
data on the quality of implementation from the Bolsa Familia (BF) programme, this paper models 
associations between the key variables. The findings suggest some nuanced findings on capacity and 
the nature of poverty in municipalities, which seems to suggest that overall resources are perhaps 
less important than the approach taken in a municipality to BF implementation. The supply-side 
appears to matter, both in terms of the quality of services associated with beneficiaries meeting BF 
conditionalities as well as how they are provided. As a result, the paper suggests that those designing 
CCTs should perhaps invest more in the supply of services. 
Bolsa Familia in Brazil and similar CCT programmes have been copied in Latin America and other 
continents and countries (e. g. the Philippines, Indonesia, Uganda, India). The evidence on CCTs 
increasingly concludes that they are successful in raising household expenditure and promote the 
take-up of health and education services, contributing in some cases to significant reductions in 
poverty rates. [1, 2]  Impact evaluations have increased the understanding of the relationship of the 
coverage of beneficiaries, targeting of households and incentive levels (level of benefits) in a CCT 
programme with the effectiveness of these programmes at household level. 1  However, the 
understanding of which programme and contextual factors influence the success of these 
programmes remains limited. This in turn limits knowledge on what works in what context, which is 
of crucial importance as CCT programmes spread across the globe. 
This paper seeks to shed further light into the ‘black box ‘of a CCT by reviewing relevant Brazilian 
federal datasets and modelling associations between key variables.  The ‘black box’ of 
implementation refers to a range of programme and external factors that could impact the outcome 
of a CCT programme. Programme variables can refer to the capacity and resources of those 
implementing BF as well as the provision of health and education services that beneficiaries engage 
with. External variables consist of political, demographic and geographic factors. With regards to 
outcomes, the paper looks at the municipal level of implementation and examines the quality of 
decision-making at the local level in registering beneficiaries and monitoring conditionalities. In 
2 
 
short, the paper wants to understand better how the decentralised approach used in Brazil is 
contributing to programme outcomes.  
About Bolsa Familia 
Bolsa Família (BF) is a social development programme that seeks to alleviate poverty and build 
human capital through providing financial support to households in poverty. BF is a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programme. Households receive financial support as long as they comply with certain 
conditions such as children’s school attendance, vaccinations and regular health check-ups for 
mothers and their children.[1] Typically, these cash transfers are made directly to the mother in the 
household, which seems to lead to more investment in human capital building.[3] In addition, the 
programme seeks to empower beneficiaries by linking them to complementary services.  
The BF Programme introduced in 2003 combined federal Brazilian early CCT programmes, Bolsa 
Escola, Bolsa Alimentação,  Cartão Alimentação, and Auxilio Gas, aimed at improving school 
enrolment, household food consumption, and  lowering household costs of fuel respectively. The 
programme is strongly identified as a policy of the former President Luis Inàcio Lula da Silva.[4, 5]   It 
currently covers all Brazilian poor or over 13 million Brazilian households, which is about one quarter 
of the population.[5] As such it is the largest CCT of its kind in the world.  
An important feature of BF is a decentralised approach to the administration of the programme.[6] 
The Ministry of Social Development (MDS), created in January 2004, sets overall social protection 
policy and supervises the implementation of BF. Secretariats in the MDS are responsible for 
overseeing the programme and its registry; beneficiary selection, payment authorisation, 
compliance with conditionalities. The Ministry is also involved in training municipal managers; 
coordinating with other ministerial departments implementing other parts of the government’s 
social policy; and undertaking impact evaluations and wider monitoring.   
Municipalities have a wide range of roles including: providing a local point of contact or BF 
coordinator; registering beneficiaries, monitoring health and education conditionalities; local 
programme monitoring; and referring BF beneficiaries for other services. As such municipalities are 
the main interface between BF and beneficiaries.  
Interestingly given their importance in the Brazilian federal system, the states have traditionally had 
a more limited role in BF. [6] They provide mostly training and support to municipalities, though 
their role has expanded more recently to include more involvement in ensuring the consistency of 
implementation and some oversight of municipalities. Other parties involved in administering BF 
include: the Caixa Econômica Federal, which manages the national registry database and provides 
unique identifiers and electronic payment cards;  the Ministries of Health and Education, which have 
responsibilities for guidance and training of municipal officers on the conditionalities and providing 
information on compliance to the MDS; the General Controllers Office (CGU), the Federal Audits 
Court (TCU), and the Office of the Public Prosecutor (MP), which are control bodies and are 
responsible for formal oversight.  
The BF Programme proved to be popular among municipal governments and the general population. 
The adoption of the program was voluntary but almost uniformly municipalities established the 
programme. Up to 2008 only four out of the 5564 had not signed an agreement with the federal 
government to implement the programme.[7]  
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What is in the black box of implementation? 
The literature on BF offers mainly case studies on implementation from different evaluations and 
articles. Through these case studies, it highlights many programme and external factors as being 
important in the effective implementation of BF. Studies note issues around: the capacity of 
municipalities; the supply of services; the integration of services, which interact strongly with 
geography; political motivations; levels of poverty; and urban versus rural context. These are 
discussed in more detail below.  
Municipal capacity 
Municipal capacity is seen as a significant problem in the effective implementation of BF. One study 
points to difficulty in gathering data on eligible families.[7] Rio Branco, a remote municipality in the 
state of Acre with a highly mobile population, is an example of severely limited administrative 
capacity. Before the BF programme the local administration lacked any systematic and up to date 
registry of its population. The registries that did exist, like the Bolsa Escola registry CADBES, were not 
compatible and could not be integrated into the Cadastro Unico (the unified BF registry). The local 
government relied on local civil society including the local university and the federal government in a 
concerted reform effort that achieved significant increases in targeting. The municipal government 
of Rio Branco was able to reduce the total number of eligible families by about 30% by updating the 
registry and deleting double entries.[6]  
Moreover, producing data on the compliance with conditions in a timely fashion exceeded the 
capacities in many municipalities, especially in poor municipalities. In 2005 55% of hospitals reported 
back data, in 2006 this number increased to 95%.[1] In 2009 the health information for recipients 
were still only at 63%.[8] This is of course highly relevant for actually enforcing compliance with the 
conditions. Only in 2007 benefits started being cut because of non-compliance but measuring 
compliance remains a challenge.[8] Time-lags due to slow capacity building could explain 
performance of different municipalities. Early adopters of prior programmes like Bolsa Escola (e. g. 
the cities of Brasilia and Campinas[9]) could have a significant advantage in existing capacity because 
of their experience and early involvement with similar programmes.  
The national government has tried to address this issue in municipalities like Vitoria in the state of 
Espirito Santo. In Victoria the local infrastructure was lacking in several respects e.g. staffing, 
information systems or logistics. The result was an intense overhaul of many local governmental 
institutions and the adoption of new responsibilities including outreach to families, upgrade of local 
information technology, establishment of national semi-monthly supervisory meetings, trainings for 
local staff and coordination with local pre-schools. The results of this overhaul have been very 
positive. The number of covered children tripled within 2 years, malnutrition among that group was 
halved to 7% and risk of malnutrition fell to 12%.[6] 
Quality of education and health services 
Supply-side issues, meaning the insufficient quality of educational and medical institutions, are 
noted to have a significant negative influence on the impact of CCT’s like Bolsa Família.[10] The 
differences in quality of care and education further increase geographic differences in Brazil. The 
northeast of Brazil is an area with a less developed infrastructure. Forty nine per cent of all families 
who are receiving cash transfers through BF live here.[11] The medical and educational 
infrastructure largely remains insufficient. Public health expenditure per capita in 2006 was 42% 
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higher in the southeast compared to the northeast.[7] The severe geographical differences exist not 
only in healthcare but also in the educational sector “In 2000 spending in education per capita was 
three times higher in Roraima than in Pará and all the states in the northeast were below the 
Brazilian average. Unfortunately, differences in spending have changed little in the last decade“.[7] 
Without a proper supply infrastructure, the impact of any intervention is expected to be limited: 
Conditional cash transfers “can themselves only function properly in terms of strengthening demand 
for and democratizing access to basic social services such as education and health if the actual 
supply of such services is adequate in the first place”.[12]  
Coordination and integration of services 
Coordination between the different levels of government and different local institutions proves to 
be challenging in many different contexts. Other CCT’s like Youth Agent, a programme for young 
children in the Brazilian city of Campinas, encountered similar issues including serving families twice 
or being unable to combine different registries.[13] Lindert identifies three areas of coordination 
problems: third-party principle agent problems, the heterogeneous quality of implementation and 
interaction between the BF and other local programmes. For this range of problems he observes 
different economic (e.g. performance pay for Caixa) and institutional (formal joint agreements) or 
social (BF award) solutions. To what degree these solutions work or what their specific influences 
are, is not investigated in detail.[6] 
Integration of services is also a clear factor in successful implementation of BF. Integration of 
services has clear benefits. Beyond a likely increase of effectiveness over time, Fiszbein observes 
positive spill-over effects to other governmental institutions now using targeting and coordination 
mechanisms originally designed for the BF in other contexts.[1] Reaching such a state of integration 
of social policies seems to be a difficult process.  In general Sánchez-Ancochea notices a “limited 
integration between different components of the system.” (309)[7] in local Brazilian administrations. 
A case study focussing on the implementation of the Bolsa Família Programme in Manguinhos 
identifies this lack of integration between local governmental and quasi-governmental institutions 
are a major limiting factor to the programme’s impact and success. Manguinhos is a village in the 
municipality of Serra in Espírito Santo. Because of a lack of a formal street lay-out or urban 
infrastructure, the local administration struggled to identify eligible families in the first place. 
Monitoring the compliance with the conditions, specifically integrating data on medical check-ups, 
proved to be difficult, leading to a situation where “bureaucracy and parallelism went hand in hand 
with fragile inter-sectoral integration”[14].  
On a national level large scale governmental programmes remain disconnected or run parallel. There 
are some instances of vertical integration, in which the BF is coordinated with other social 
programmes including coordinated or joint payments that have seen successful integration.  
Some municipalities like Sao Paolo or Belo Horizonte have achieved integration of health, education 
and employment support by coordinating the efforts of BF with local initiatives. In these 
municipalities social worker check-ups happen as often as bi-weekly, not only to guarantee 
compliance but to start human capital building and the move out of poverty. This, however, is not 
the case in many or most municipalities.[6] 
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Political motivation 
The relationship between political motivation and successful implementation and BF is also 
important. Minimizing the involvement of the states and organising the project mostly on the 
national and an empowered municipal level is seen as one of the reasons for the success of the CCT 
programme in Brazil.[11] Even though BF was closely associated with President Lula, the programme 
and its predecessors were supported by a large number of political parties. Because of the absence 
of strong partisan identification, the programme was accepted by mayors of other party affiliations 
on the local level in many cases.[9] Financial support and the allocation of BF funds do not seem to 
be determined by party affiliation of the municipalities. Fried compares the number of families 
eligible for support with the number of families that actually receive financial support through the 
BF programme. He finds that the variations in the distribution do not correlate with the affiliation of 
local politicians.[2] Avoiding governors at the state level is seen as beneficial for the BF because of 
their ability to severely constrain national policies and limit their impact. The direct contracts 
between the national government and the municipalities circumvented that risk.[11]  
However, there also appears an interesting relationship between electoral gain and successful 
implementation. This can be witnessed when looking at municipal elections and performance in BF: 
Good performance, or more precisely, absence of “public denouncements of illegitimate inclusion of 
beneficiaries”, is awarded with a 26% increase in the chance to win the coming election.[15, 16] The 
positive effect on election outcomes caused by a successful BF Programme seems to be understood 
by the local politicians, as the performance of the BF Programme is dependent on the respective 
mayor’s eligibility for re-election. If a mayor is running for a second term, the programme’s impact 
increases by 36% compared to mayors in their second term (lame duck). This effect is robust when 
controlling for professional experience and other local effects, like different degrees of poverty.[16] 
Individual motivation of the involved political actors therefore seems to be a highly relevant factor in 
the effectiveness of BF. 
BF is said to have been used to gain popularity by politicians on the level of municipalities as well.[5] 
A recent analysis of municipal level data of state elections suggests that the popularity of CCT’s has a 
positive effect for the incumbent president in general. Interestingly, this effect is independent of 
party affiliation. This analysis demonstrates how these effects not only favoured Lula but also Serra 
in 2002, even though Serra still lost the election. There is furthermore a connection to the 
geographic differences discussed earlier. Zucco observes that “both parties performed better in 
more developed municipalities when in opposition, and once in office both parties perform better in 
less developed municipalities. This association holds within almost all of Brazil's 26 states.”(24)[17] 
The BF Programme seems to carry a large influence on voting outcome, especially awarding 
incumbents, if the programme is run well. Similarly to economic growth and recession periods, these 
voting effects seem to have their largest influence rather short term. An effect on voter realignment 
cannot be seen.[17] From this perspective, one could hypothesise that a higher priority and thus a 
better performance in BF operations is expected in municipalities where eligible families make up a 
larger part of the population. 
Municipal poverty levels 
Extreme poverty has detrimental effect on the educational impact of BF. Even if the programme 
achieves its goal of increasing participation in the school system, children of extremely poor families 
are likely to start with a significant disadvantage in abilities.[1] This could be one of the reasons why 
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the school system has been largely unable to capitalise on increased attendance and hasn’t been 
able to produce impressive increases in educational parameters.[7] However, the effect on 
education outcomes is a point of contention as the progress is judged more positively in other 
studies.[5] The poor and extremely poor furthermore have less access to public medical and 
educational services, widening the gap between the classes and limiting the impact on health on 
those most affected by poverty.[18] The number of children per family has been used as a first 
screening variable by most municipalities (79%), suggesting that a high number of children is 
positively related to eligibility for BF.(29)[16] Health parameters show the persistent inequality in 
health and access to healthcare between different groups of the population. As a result child 
mortality, for example, is 138% higher among the indigenous population and 37% higher in the black 
population compared to the white population.[10]  
Targeting is a challenge for many CCT programmes. Overall the BF Programme is thought to be very 
good at targeting.[8] Still, BF is suffering from significant exclusion rates. Because the BF Programme 
is based on self-reporting, the families most reliant on the cash transfers might be excluded because 
they are unable to provide the necessary paperwork.[7, 19]Families in the lowest income class have 
difficulty producing proof of residence, civil document or food purchase invoices.[20] Reporting on 
yearly self-income seems to be especially difficult for poor families because of income volatility and 
the instable and unofficial nature of many working arrangements. Additionally, information about BF 
and the availability of financial support reaches different households to a different degree.[3] These 
effects are also suspected by Fiszbein: ‘Household constraints’, meaning a family’s ability to take 
advantage of the provided governmental assistance programmes, could be a limiting factor on the 
CCT’s impact.[1] Because of these difficulties the population structure, combined with the often 
related supply-side issues in low-income areas, is thought to have a direct negative impact on the 
efficacy of the BF. 
Urban versus rural context 
The urban or rural nature of the place in which the programme is administered may have an impact 
on the effectiveness of a programme.[3] In the Mexican Oportunidades programme, a nationwide 
CCT with similar conditions, this has been visible through higher dropout rates among the poorest 
families that live in remote, mostly rural, areas.[8] However, this does not mean that families in 
urban environments can take better advantage of the BF Programme. Assessments about poverty 
alleviation show that urban areas are not at a general advantage when it comes to outcomes. It 
seems to be rather the opposite: the effect on the urban poor seems to be smaller and less effective 
in supporting the move out of poverty than the effects on poor families in rural areas, where the 
program has proven to be more effective.[7] When looking at regional and supply-side issues the 
effects seem to be multi-layered and in some cases work in contrary directions. 
Towards research hypotheses 
In summary, the literature, though in places quite anecdotal, suggests a number of hypotheses that 
can be tested further in the modelling for this paper: 
• Low capacity municipalities have poorer quality of implementation of BF 
• Larger municipalities with more resources have better quality of implementation 
• Good quality service provision is significantly associated with good implementation 
• Lack of coordination and integration leads to lower quality of implementation 
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• There is an association between electoral gain and quality of implementation 
• Extreme poverty of the municipality is associated with more problematic implementation 
• The rural and urban context should not matter in the quality of implementation 
Defining the relevant variables 
Brazil lends itself well for a study looking at the ‘black box’ of a social protection programme. Firstly, 
it is a large country with over 5565 municipalities operating in different environmental and local 
policy contexts. As such, its size provides an opportunity to see how a federal programme is being 
implemented across a range of different local contexts. Secondly, Brazil unlike some other mid-
income countries has good and recent federal datasets in a number of areas related to the ‘black 
box’ of implementation covering most municipalities. Finally, BF is one of the few CCTs that have an 
explicit quality of implementation measure against which all municipalities are assessed, the 
Decentralized Management Index (Índice de Gestão Descentralizada [IGD]).  
This paper analyses these datasets and seeks to establish the associations between programme and 
external variables and the quality of BF implementation in municipalities. These associations are 
based on a snapshot analysis of the data covering the period of 2009-2010 or the most recent 
available data. As such, the analysis is not longitudinal.  
Programme and external variables included in the analysis are given in Table 1 and fall into four main 
categories:  
• municipal capacity variables such as per capita municipal budgets and resources (C);  
• the provision of services at municipal level including supply-side variables such as the quality 
of education and health provision and the way services  are integrated or not at the 
municipal level (S).  
• political variables such as electoral outcomes and elections(P);  
• demographic variables such as poverty levels and ethnicity (D);  
• geographic variables such as regions (G);  
Most of these variables are collected in the year 2010, except the following variables from the year 
2011 - political variables, the health service performance index (IDSUS), basic education index (IDEB), 
and binary variable for presence of food card programme. Further, these data come from a variety 
of sources collected using variety of survey instruments. The preliminary 2010 Census poverty 
estimates are from Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger, collected by means of 
the household surveys. The Brazil census classifies population groups mainly on the basis of skin 
colour and whether they belong to indigenous groups. The data related to electoral outcomes were 
obtained from the website of Estatistica TSE (www.tse.jus.br). These political variables correspond to 
the results of 2008 municipal elections. The municipal financial information was available from the 
Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (Treasury Secretariat) from the Ministerio da Fazenda through a 
report- Financas do Brasil: Dados Contabeis dos Municipios 2010. We also use data (from year 2010) 
related to basic social protection services provided through social assistance centres called Centros 
de Referência de Assistência Social (CRAS).  
The health service performance index- IDSUS for year 2011 is a composite index on the scale of 0 to 
10. The ministry of health assigns this index after giving consideration to variety of factors including 
population, socioeconomic background and child mortality.  IDSUS encompasses three sub-indices: 
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Socioeconomic Development (IDSE), Health Conditions (ICS) and Structure of the Municipality's 
Health System (IESSM). It captures the level of access and quality of health service based on the 
above three indices and groups the municipalities in six homogeneous groups as per their score.  
The basic education index1 (IDEB) for year 2011 is developed by the Anisio Teixeira National Institute 
for Educational Studies and Research (INEP) under the Ministry of Education to measure the flow 
and quality of education on the scale of 0 to 10. We used the IDEB values for the fourth grade 
students in schools administered by municipalities. 
We created composite indices (v3249_total to v3261_total) for relationship between Centros de 
Referencia de Assitencia Social (CRAS) and other services, programmes or institutions in the city . 
Each index on the scale of 0 to 8 was developed from the following conditions and the satisfaction of 
each condition counted as one point in the index. 
1. It has location data (address, phone, etc.). 
2. Accepts users referred by this CRAS 
3. Forwards users to this CRAS 
4. Tracks your referrals 
5. Holds regular meetings 
6. Information exchange 
7. Performs case studies together 
8. Carries out activities in partnership 
Table 1: Names and codes of the variables available for regression 
Variable Code Details 
Revenue and finance related variables (C) 
Top100_GDP 
Municipality is in the list of 100 most revenue (GDP) generating 
municipalities   
PC_Budget_Revenues Per capita budget revenues (R$) 
PC_Transfer_Intergov_Union Per capita transfers from Federal Government (R$) 
PC_Transf_Intergov_State Per capita transfers from state (R$) 
PC_SUS_Union Per capita transfer of Resources Health System (R$) 
PC_FNAS 
Per capita transfer of Resources from the National Social Assistance - 
FNAS (R$) 
PC_FNDE 
Per capita transfer of Resources from the National Education 
Development - ENDF (R$) 
Variables related to other programs (S) 
presence_of_Food_Card 
Presence of food card program in the municipality (1: yes, 0: no), Data 
from year 2011 
IDSUS SUS performance (Health service) index , Data from year 2011 
IDEB Basic Education Development Index , Data from year 2011 
v3243_0 
Does the municipality have list of beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família 
Program? 
v3244_0 
Does the municipality have list of families in violation of conditionalities 
of education in the Bolsa Família Program? 
v3245_0 
Does the municipality have list of families in violation of conditionalities 
Health in the Bolsa Família Program? 
                                                          
1
 Source: 
http://download.inep.gov.br/educacao_basica/portal_ideb/o_que_e_o_ideb/Nota_Tecnica_n1_concepcaoIDE
B.pdf 
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Integration software questions- Does the CRAS have access to following federal computer systems and for what purpose? 
0:no access, 1: for consultation/data entry, 2: for both consult/data entry (S) 
v3603_total 
CadÚnico- Single Registry for Social Programmes of the Federal 
Government 
v3604_total 
Sicon- Integrated management of the Conditionalities of Bolsa Família 
Program 
v3605_total SIBEC – Citizen benefit system 
Type of relationship between CRAS and other entities. Codes 0 to 8 (0: no relationship or entity does not exist, >0 : sum of 
the relationship indicators) (S) 
v3249_total Public Units of the Basic Social Protection Network 
v3250_total Covenanted Units of the Basic Social Protection Network 
v3251_total Units of the Special Social Protection Network 
v3252_total Health Services 
v3253_total Education Services  
v3254_total Agencies/ Services related to Labour and Employment 
v3255_total Services and Programs for Food Security 
v3256_total Services and programs of Public Safety 
v3257_total BF Grant Programme 
v3258_total Protection Council 
v3259_total Councils Public Policy and Advocacy 
v3260_total Programs and Projects Digital Inclusion 
v3261_total Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
Political variables (P), data from year 2008  
perc_votes_Muncipality Percentage votes won by the party in power in the municipality 
suppl_election_municipality Supplementary election held (1: yes, 0: no) 
Same_Party_StateMunic Same ruling party both at municipal and state level (1: yes, 0: no) 
votegt95 
Ruling party secured very high over 95% (almost all) of the votes (1: yes, 
0: no) 
Population related variables (D)  
Total_households Number of households  
log_Total_households Log(total households in the municipality) 
large_100k Population of the municipality is over 100,000 (1:Yes, 0:No) 
Poverty related variables (D) 
perc_Rural_households Percentage of households that are in rural areas 
perc_rural_hhlds_in_ext_pov percentage of households in rural area that are in poverty 
perc_urban_hhlds_in_ext_pov percentage of households in urban area that are in poverty 
perc_males_in_ext_poor percentage of males in the residents who are in extreme poverty 
perc_White_in_ext_poor 
percentage of white residents in the residents who are in extreme 
poverty 
perc_Black_in_ext_poor 
percentage of black residents in the residents who are in extreme 
poverty 
perc_Yellow_in_ext_poor 
percentage of yellow residents in the residents who are in extreme 
poverty 
perc_Brown_in_ext_poor 
percentage of brown residents in the residents who are in extreme 
poverty 
perc_Indigenous_in_ext_poor 
percentage of indigenous residents in the residents who are in extreme 
poverty 
perc_BlcknIndg_in_poor 
percentage of black or indigenous residents in the residents who are in 
extreme poverty 
perc_minority_in_poor 
percentage of black, yellow and indigenous residents in the residents 
who are in extreme poverty 
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Geography (G) 
Region_N North (1: if Municipality is situated in North region, 0: otherwise) 
Region_S South (1: if Municipality is situated in South region, 0: otherwise) 
Region_NE Northeast (1: if Municipality is situated in Northeast region, 0: otherwise) 
Region_CW 
Central-west (1: if Municipality is situated in Central-west region, 0: 
otherwise) 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for variables 
Variable Code N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Dependent variable 
avg_IGD 5565 .13 .97 .79 .08 
Revenue and finance related variables (C )       
Top100_GDP 5565 .0000 1.00 .02 .13 
PC_Budget_Revenues 5212 364.32 13671.62 1858.80 915.39 
PC_Transfer_Intergov_Union 5212 .00 11548.69 929.51 577.59 
PC_Transf_Intergov_State 5212 .00 8259.79 443.28 452.22 
PC_SUS_Union 5212 .00 813.86 105.89 56.03 
PC_FNAS 5212 .00 120.85 13.99 13.00 
PC_FNDE 5212 .00 630.67 38.24 20.71 
Variables related to other programs (S) 
presence_of_Food_Card 5565 .00 1.00 0.11 .32 
IDSUS 5563 2.50 8.37 5.65 .84 
IDEB 4960 1.40 8.60 4.42 1.01 
v3243_0 4437 .00 1.00 0.06 .23 
v3244_0 4437 .00 1.00 0.16 .35 
v3245_0 4437 .00 1.00 0.20 .39 
CRAS integration 
v3603_total 4421 .00 2.00 1.12 .76 
v3604_total 4421 .00 2.00 .93 .79 
v3605_total 4421 .00 2.00 .88 .81 
Type of relationship between CRAS and other entities 
v3249_total 4437 .00 8.00 4.83 2.82 
v3250_total 4437 .00 8.00 2.40 2.90 
v3251_total 4437 .00 8.00 3.39 3.19 
v3252_total 4437 .00 8.00 5.39 2.07 
v3253_total 4437 .00 8.00 5.05 2.23 
v3254_total 4437 .00 8.00 1.44 2.22 
v3255_total 4437 .00 8.00 1.79 2.51 
v3256_total 4437 .00 8.00 1.63 2.27 
v3257_total 4437 .00 8.00 6.07 2.27 
v3258_total 4437 .00 8.00 5.95 2.15 
v3259_total 4437 .00 8.00 3.76 2.95 
v3260_total 4437 .00 8.00 2.53 2.63 
v3261_total 4437 .00 8.00 2.16 2.69 
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Political variables 
perc_votes_Muncipality 5555 21.76 100.00 57.03 13.82 
suppl_election_municipality 5564 .00 1.00 .02 .15 
Same_Party_StateMunic 5564 .00 1.00 .16 .37 
votegt95 5555 .00 1.00 .05 .22 
Population related variables  
log_Total_households 5565 5.48 15.09 8.20 1.14 
large_100k 5565 .00 1.00 .05 .22 
Poverty related variables  
perc_Rural_households 5565 .00 .95 .35 .21 
perc_rural_hhlds_in_ext_pov 5565 .00 .86 .16 .15 
perc_urban_hhlds_in_ext_pov 5565 .00 .48 .09 .08 
perc_males_in_ext_poor 5565 .00 .75 .50 .03 
perc_White_in_ext_poor 5565 .00 1.00 .39 .22 
perc_Black_in_ext_poor 5565 .00 .59 .08 .06 
perc_Yellow_in_ext_poor 5565 .00 .22 .01 .01 
perc_Brown_in_ext_poor 5565 .00 1.00 .50 .20 
perc_Indigenous_in_ext_poor 5565 .00 .94 .02 .08 
perc_BlcknIndg_in_poor 5565 .00 .94 .10 .10 
perc_minority_in_poor 5565 .00 .94 .11 .10 
Geography 
Region_N 5565 .00 1.00 .08 .27 
Region_S 5565 .00 1.00 .21 .41 
Region_NE 5565 .00 1.00 .32 .47 
Region_SE 5565 .00 1.00 .30 .46 
Region_CW 5565 .00 1.00 .08 .28 
 
The quality of implementation is assessed by looking at the IGD score of each municipality. The IGD 
was introduced in 2006 by the MDS to measure the quality of municipal implementation and to 
incentivise municipalities to improve performance. [6]  The IGD combines aspects of the demand for 
services with supply of services. The index is calculated on the basis of the sum of four components 
which have equal weight in calculating the index (each 25%), the components are: the share of 
families with a complete and consistent registration; the share of families with registries updated at 
least within the last two years; the share of families with complete information on compliance with 
health conditionalities;  the share of children in the programme with complete information on 
compliance with education conditionalities (as a share of all BF children ages 6-15). The sum of these 
components is then divided by four.  
On the basis of the IGD score, municipalities can receive additional programme resources. This 
incentive is available for a score over 0.8. Initially, these resources would consist of an increased 
quota to register new families as the BF programme worked with individual quota for municipalities. 
However as the coverage of the programme has expanded, municipalities have been given more 
discretion on how to use these additional resources. The number of municipalities that qualify for 
additional programme support has increased as IGD scores have improved over time.  
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This paper looks at the whole IGD as an outcome measure, because it aligns our model with how 
Brazilian policy-makers assess the quality of implementation and incentivise municipalities.  
Figure 1 gives a sense of the distribution of IGD scores across municipalities for the period 2009 - 
2010 and suggests a clustering of municipalities around the 0.8 quality threshold.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average IGD scores across Brazilian municipalities in the period of January 2009 to 
October 2010 
Modelling the associations between variables 
Regression analysis was used to examine the associations between the various variables. The 
programme and external variables were taken as independent variables and the IGD as a dependent 
variable.  The IGD score for each municipality and its components were used as the dependent 
variables in the analysis to test their correlation with other capacity (C), supply-side (S), demographic 
(D), and political (P) variables. These dependent variables are the averages of scores over time (from 
January 2009 to November 2010). Further, the values are between 0 and 1, hence the regression 
technique used must account for it. We used a generalised linear model (glm) for our data analysis.  
The glm can be denoted as: 
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In this model µ is the expected value of the dependent variable and g(µ) is a smooth and invertible 
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confined in the interval [0, 1] to entire real line from -∞ to ∞. The error term or the random 
component of the glm model specifies the conditional distribution of the dependent variable given 
the values of the independent variables X. For our data we use binomial distribution (family) which is 
more suitable for dependent variable in [0, 1]. The glm model is estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation. We use STATA2 to estimate the generalised linear model (glm) with a logit link and the 
binomial family as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge. [22] 
In the model building exercise we gradually included variables one by one and retained only those 
variables which were significant at the 90 % level of confidence. The number of observations for the 
model depends on the missing values in the independent variables.  For example, the average value 
of IGD across months for the municipality Nazária, PI (IBGE= 2206720) is very low, because of zero 
scores in the initial months. Similarly, there are 34 municipalities for which the IGD score in October 
and November 2010 is missing. These municipalities were excluded from the regression analysis. 
Limitations 
The approach chosen has a number of limitations. Firstly, the datasets included do not all cover the 
same period as indicated in Table 1. For example, the political variables correspond to the year 2008, 
the basic education development index is for the year 2011, while most of the other variables are 
from 2010. There are practical reasons for this, which relate to when this data is collected by the 
Brazilian government and made available. As such, the model may not capture specific or subtle 
changes in the datasets. In some ways, the expectation inherent in the model is that certain 
variables such as municipal capacity, quality of services, integration of services, and poverty are 
unlikely to show significant changes in a relatively small number of years. Nonetheless, Brazil has 
shown rapid social changes and there is a risk that our model may not capture specific and 
substantial changes.  
Similarly, the model offers a snapshot rather than a longitudinal picture. As such, it does not show 
trends over time between a range of variables. For instance, it cannot reflect on changes in macro-
economic conditions or specific changes in government budgets. Secondly, the municipal datasets 
are not all complete. As such, we had to exclude some municipalities from the analysis. This may 
create a small bias if this exclusion is systematic as a result of correlation between missing data and 
implementation.  
Thirdly, the datasets as outlined in Table 1 do not cover all relevant variables that make up the ‘black 
box’ of implementation. The model uses proxy variables that may only capture factors to a certain 
extent. For instance, municipal capacity is likely to extend beyond the resources a municipality has 
and includes aspects such as the experience and skills of staff, which we do not measure. Moreover, 
the model does not include variables related to other actors in implementation such as the federal 
and state government and audit bodies. There are no variables related to accountability and 
oversight.  Finally, there are no variables capturing social capital in Brazilian municipalities. 
Fourthly, the model uses the IGD as an outcome measure. This measure is self-reported in parts by 
the municipalities. As such, it is open to gaming and may not be as reliable as data gathered in a 
more controlled manner such as through household surveys. Furthermore, there seems quite a bit of 
variation or volatility in the monthly IGD score of municipalities over a certain period. To smoothen 
                                                          
2
 see details at: http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/logit-transformation/ 
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out some of the volatility in the reporting of the IGD the modelling approach presented here took an 
average of the IGD score over a period of about 18 months as explained earlier. Though this may 
give a more consistent picture of performance over time, it may not counter a determined effort by 
some municipalities to misrepresent their quality of implementation, especially given the incentive 
associated with a score over 0.8.  
Fifthly, the model captures associations and cannot be specific on direction of causality. As such, it is 
hard to know whether the quality of implementation is caused by a specific factor such as the level 
of poverty or whether poor quality of implementation influences the level of poverty. Finally, several 
of the factors included in the analysis may be interrelated. For example, the capacity of a 
municipality may influence the quality of services, which may influence the integration of services. 
Such interdependencies need to be taken into account when interpreting the model and findings. 
Findings 
The model shows the associations between the key independent variables and dependent variable 
(quality of implementation) included in the model. Table 3 present the outputs of the final model. 
The log pseudo-likelihood for final model (-1314.81) is much higher than that for the constant only 
model (-1987.27) indicating a better model fit than the constant only model. We use this 
information for the analysis of deviance (analogue to the ANOVA for linear models). The residual 
deviance for a glm is defined as: Dm = 2(logLs- logLm), where logLm and logLs are the log of 
maximum likelihoods for the given model and the saturated (one parameter to each observation) 
model respectively[21]. The residual deviance for constant only model (Dc) is also called as the null 
deviance and it can be used to estimate R2, which represents the proportion of the null deviance 
accounted for by the final model. The R2 is estimated as: R
2 = 1 – (Dm – Dc). We find that the final 
model has R2 value of 0.61. 
Table 3: Significant results from model 
Description Coeff. Std. Er Z P 95% CI 
Basic Education Development 
Index 
0.0236 0.0090 2.63 0.009 0.006 0.041 
Health service index  0.0328 0.0087 3.77 0.000 0.016 0.050 
Indicator for CRAS relationship 
with Education Service 
Agencies (score 0 to 8) 
0.0065 0.0032 2.00 0.045 0.000 0.013 
Indicator for CRAS relationship 
with Bolsa Familia program 
(score 0 to 8) 
0.0081 0.0032 2.53 0.011 0.002 0.014 
Binary (ruling party in 
municipality got more than 
95% votes) 
-0.0819 0.0372 -2.20 0.028 -0.155 -0.009 
Percentage votes for the 
winning party 
0.1652 0.0555 2.98 0.003 0.056 0.274 
Binary variable : Presence of 
food card in the municipality 
0.0767 0.0187 4.10 0.000 0.040 0.113 
Percentage of “Yellow” people 
in poor 
1.0069 0.5404 1.86 0.062 -0.052 2.066 
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Percentage of “Brown” people 
in poor 
0.3383 0.0398 8.49 0.000 0.260 0.416 
Percentage of rural 
households in extreme 
poverty 
0.4509 0.0678 6.65 0.000 0.318 0.584 
Log( per capita budget 
revenues) 
-0.1013 0.0275 -3.69 0.000 -0.155 -0.047 
Log( per capita transfers from 
Federal Government) 
0.0697 0.0260 2.68 0.007 0.019 0.121 
Log( per capita transfers from 
State) 
-0.0235 0.0094 -2.51 0.012 -0.042 -0.005 
Log( per capita transfers from 
National Social Assistance) 
0.0081 0.0022 3.61 0.000 0.004 0.012 
Log (Total households in the 
municipality) 
-0.1145 0.0087 -13.24 0.000 -0.131 -0.098 
Binary (Municipality in NE 
region) 
0.2397 0.0198 12.14 0.000 0.201 0.278 
Binary (Municipality in CW 
region) 
-0.0745 0.0213 -3.49 0.000 -0.116 -0.033 
Constant 1.9071 0.2205 8.65 0.000 1.475 2.339 
Number of observations: 3,777 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1314.81 
Deviance =73.06 
Log pseudo-likelihood (constant only model) = -1987.27 
Deviance(constant only model)  = 187.169 
 
These findings are then discussed in light of the research hypotheses developed earlier in the paper 
on the basis of a review of the literature.  
Municipal capacity 
The expectation was that low capacity was associated with poor quality of implementation. The 
model presents some conflicting evidence and it indicates that this may be the case to some extent. 
Capacity here is measured mostly by transfers and municipal revenues. Municipalities that have 
lower transfers from the federal government and the National Social Assistance Fund also have 
lower quality of implementation scores. As such there is a positive association between such 
transfers and the quality of implementation index (IGD). However, not all relevant variables show a 
positive correlation. Transfers from the states and per capita budget show a negative association 
with quality of implementation. 
How can this be explained? States have a relatively minor implementation role in BF. They have 
mostly a supporting function in BF implementation. They support municipalities through training and 
technical support. One possible explanation is that state transfers are made available to poorer 
performing municipalities. As such, the model may be capturing a more targeted approach by states 
to make funds available to those municipalities with problems implementing BF to a high standard 
and as a consequence larger state transfers would logically be associated with poorer performance 
of the municipalities.  
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In terms of per capita budget, the model suggests that those municipalities with more resources per 
citizen also have a worse IGD score. Intuitively, this result does not make sense as one would expect 
better resources to lead to better administrative capacity or service delivery and then better 
programme implementation. There could be two explanations. It could be the size of municipalities 
implementing BF. The second could be targeting financial support. The literature appears to suggest 
that more targeted support can have a significant impact. [6]  Therefore, one could surmise from the 
modelling results that targeted transfers with specific aims (e.g. training and infrastructure 
improvements) are likely to be more important in raising the quality of implementation of BF than 
overall municipal resources. This would also speak to raising the quality of supporting or 
complementary services.  
Size of municipality 
The expectation was the larger municipalities with better resources would also show better quality 
of implementation. However, the model seems to suggest otherwise. The number of households in a 
municipality appears to be negatively correlated with the IGD score as is per capita budget. 
Moreover, there is no relationship between IGD score and municipal or state GDP per capita. The 
results seem to suggest that ‘smaller may be better’. There could be good reasons for this. It may be 
difficult to reach all beneficiaries in large municipalities due to distances between populations, the 
presence of isolated communities, and the occurrence of violence in communities. In other words, 
access to services may be easier in smaller municipalities. The provision of services may also be 
uneven, which may affect the quality of registration and checking of conditionalities, which make up 
the IGD score. The organisation of BF implementation may be less complex in smaller municipalities 
than in larger municipalities. It may also be the case that BF implementation is not a sole priority in 
larger and better resourced municipalities. The poorest may compete with other groups for political 
influence and indeed access to services.  
Quality of services 
An important aspect of municipal capacity is the quality of services. As discussed above, it may be 
that the quality of services and how services are provided is the best way to reflect on municipal 
capacity in a CCT.  
The literature suggests a correlation between quality of services and the IGD. [10]  The model 
confirms this association. Municipalities with a better quality of health and education services 
according to the indices also have a better IGD score. The index of health (IDSUS) is a synthetic score 
consisting of coverage of health services (e.g. number of service providers as a proportion of the 
population) as well as outcomes (examples are vaccine rates, live births, and cervical smears), while 
the education index (IDEB) measures student performance on standard tests. These associations 
seem to indicate the importance of the supply of service (as represented in the indices) in CCT 
programme design also noted in the growing body of evidence on the effectiveness of CCT 
programmes globally.[12]   
Integration and coordination 
Similarly, studies suggest that integration and coordination of services remains limited and suggest 
that such integration is important in good programme implementation.[7] Such integration and 
coordination are hard to measure and as such to model. Using data from a survey of local social 
assistance offices (CRAS), the model shows strong associations between particular aspects of 
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integration and the IGD score. In particular, the associations between the IGD score and the level of 
integration of the local social assistance offices or CRAS in the BF programme and between the IGD 
index and the level of integration between the CRAS and education agencies seem significant. Level 
of integration here means deeper integration of service provision (e.g. being able to register BF 
beneficiaries in CRAS, cross-using of databases at municipal level; and using BF to assign 
beneficiaries to complementary services) as captured in the CRAS survey are associated.  
Municipalities with deeper specific integration also have higher quality of implementation scores.  
This finding is interesting as it reflects not just on the quality of services but also on how services are 
provided. However, this finding is not significant for all areas of integration and coordination. Other 
factors such as integration with health services and other social agencies show no significant 
association with the overall quality of implementation index. This may indicate either that 
collaboration between specific parts of public administration is more critical to successful BF 
implementation or that certain programmes are just not particularly complementary.  
Politics 
One assumption is that BF could be used for political gain. There is an expectation that better 
implementation could be associated with specific political parties being in power or specific election 
results. The model similar to the literature (see e.g. Fried[2]) does not find a significant association 
between the political party and the quality of implementation. This finding suggests that BF has 
become broadly embraced across the political divide. Certain political parties are no less likely than 
others to show specific quality of implementation of BF when in power. However, the election result 
does seem to matter. This again is similar to the literature.[15, 16]  The model suggests that the 
electoral majority of the winning party in municipal elections is associated with a higher IGD score.  
There are number of possible explanations. Firstly, those with a larger winning percentage could be 
perceived to have a mandate to make changes and as such promote more effective administration 
of BF. This explanation would suggest a time lag between election and improved IGD score, which 
the snapshot approach in this model cannot capture. The absence of a time lag in the data suggests 
that the causal direction may be reversed, namely that better quality of implementation of BF is 
associated with a higher winning percentage in local elections. In other words, political parties in 
power by promoting better implementation of BF before the election could achieve better electoral 
results. This explanation makes sense giving the small time lag in the data sets, with the model 
including municipal election data from 2008 and IGD data mostly from 2010. The model has a 
further interesting finding.  It finds that incumbent parties that win more than 95 per cent of the 
vote also in principle show a lower municipal IGD score. This would suggest an absence of political 
competition is not helpful in promoting good programme implementation as such. Maybe, the issue 
is that political actors who achieve a very significant electoral majority become complacent in 
delivering services.  
Poverty and ethnicity 
Following from the capacity argument, a hypothesis is that those municipalities with higher levels of 
poverty or significant groups of ethnic minorities would have lower quality of implementation. The 
reason for this as noted by Fiszbein could be that poorer households are less able to take advantage 
of a programme.[1] The model does not find a significant association between overall municipal 
poverty levels and quality of implementation. However, the model finds some significant 
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associations between the number of households in subgroups living in poverty and the overall 
municipal IGD score. Those subgroups are specific groups of coloured individuals as classified in the 
Brazilian census and the rural poor. The relationship tends to be positive rather than negative. This 
finding would go against what was assumed in some studies earlier. An explanation could be 
specialisation. It may mean that municipalities with specific types of poverty would prioritise BF 
implementation more than others. In other words, it may be a reflection of the local salience of BF 
implementation given the policy context. Local administrators and politicians may have more of an 
incentive to raise the quality of implementation. As such, the implementation issue may be less the 
intrinsic nature of poverty, which is discussed as a main factor in explaining beneficiary take-up of 
CCT programmes[1], but more about how services are delivered as part of BF.  
Specialisation may also be self-reinforcing under the BF programme given the performance incentive 
in the BF programme. Fiszbein sees a positive impact from these incentives on the way social 
programmes and other administrative tasks are organised. [1] Municipalities with better 
implementation receive a higher quota or additional programme resources, which may also increase 
the performance gap with relatively poorer performing municipalities. Part of the performance gap 
could also reflect on the prior experience of some municipalities with the predecessors of the BF 
programme, such as Bolsa Escola.   
Geography 
The specialisation finding seems to some extent corroborated by looking at the relationship between 
geography and IGD implementation. Municipalities in the northeast tend to have higher poverty 
levels than those in other regions. The model finds a positive relationship between municipalities in 
the northeast and central west and the IGD score compared with others in other regions. Once 
more, it could reflect on the importance of BF and the quality of implementation in specific regional 
and demographic contexts. However, the geographic variable more generally has limited significance 
as the other regional and state variables in general do not have significant associations with the IGD 
score.  
The model finds no significant association between IGD scores in rural and urban areas informing a 
debate in the literature on how such contexts affect enrolment and implementation.[3] [7] The 
model suggests there is no strong evidence using the IGD measure of  differences in quality of 
implementation between such contexts. 
Conclusion 
The findings suggest that despite the limitations of our approach using the quality of implementation 
index (IGD) of BF as an outcome or dependent variable appears viable. The results of the model are 
plausible and seem to largely fit observations made in the literature. This may be a function of the 
size of Brazil and the number of municipalities. Even if the self-reported data of certain groups of 
municipalities contain inaccuracies, they may be cancelled out by the sheer number of data points in 
our model. As such, the approach implies that evaluations could pay more attention to self-reported 
data that is collected as part of a CCT programme. This data lends itself well to understanding 
programme and contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of a CCT. Such factors are not 
readily captured in a systematic way in impact evaluations.  As a further step, models using the IGD 
could be enhanced by aligning this outcome information with information that is collected 
independently from the programme such as household survey data. The main restriction in looking 
19 
 
at this relationship is the way evaluations of CCTs are currently set up and designed. Models using 
the IGD could also be enhanced by looking at the constituent components of the IGD. This model 
looked at the IGD as a whole, but further analysis could look at the IGD as consisting of components 
reflecting on the demand from claimants in the BF programme and the supply of services to support 
the conditionalities of the programme. This would allow for better differentiation between the key 
components that make up the quality of implementation measure.  
The model also produced some nuanced findings on capacity, which seems to suggest that overall 
resources are perhaps less important than the approach taken in a municipality to BF 
implementation. In terms of the supply-side, the model finds that not only the quality of service 
delivery is associated with the quality of implementation of BF but also how services are delivered. 
The latter speaks to specific integration and coordination of services, especially between outreach 
centres (CRAS) and the BF programme. Furthermore, the model implies some specialisation of 
municipalities in BF. This could be explained by the relative importance of BF in a locality. Certainly 
smaller municipalities with higher levels of poverty and more minority groups within their 
population show no worse quality of implementation scores than others and in specific instances 
significantly higher scores. This could speak to range of issues in service delivery:  smaller 
municipalities may be able to provide services closer to the citizen, which may be especially useful in 
targeting the poorest of the poor; such municipalities may have more control over a  system that 
requires coordination between social, health and education services, and non-governmental actors; 
and/or administrators and political leaders in smaller municipalities with a larger number of poor 
people as a proportion of the population may have a greater incentive to enrol households in BF and 
improve the quality of implementation. The latter would speak to a form of specialisation in BF 
implementation, which may be self-re-enforcing given the incentive offered to good performing 
municipalities under the BF programme. A further implication is also that the nature of poverty itself 
may not influence enrolment that much and the provision of services and the quality and nature of 
service provision may matter more.    
The model as could be expected of a meta-review of Brazilian datasets raises a number of questions. 
This speaks to the findings in two ways. Firstly, this approach is useful in understanding risk factors in 
CCT implementation. These risk factors reside in all categories of variables that were included in the 
model. Understanding the risks could lead to: additional technical support for municipalities and 
service provision at municipal level; guidance on integration of services at municipal level; and 
specific support programmes for larger municipalities with more complex service delivery among 
others. Secondly, it could inform further research at the level of the municipality to understand 
some of the dynamics that the model implies. For instance, a link between student outcomes and 
the quality of implementation is interesting but does not explain the direction of causality or the 
factors behind each such as quality of local civil servants and teachers that could be contributing to 
this positive association. The key to improving our knowledge of how programme and external 
factors influence the quality of implementation is to understand the dynamic that sits behind some 
of the positive associations that the model identifies, especially when they are less intuitive. 
Finally, there is a question how actionable these findings are for policy makers. An important lesson 
can be drawn from this model. The supply-side appears to matter, both in terms of the quality of 
services associated with beneficiaries meeting BF conditionalities as well as how they are provided. 
Here policy-makers can and perhaps should invest a larger proportion of CCT resources.  
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